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Does Network Management Matter?
The Coordination of Integration 
Policy Delivery at the Local Level  
in Sweden
AV DAVID LJUNG
Swedish integration policy is primarily implemented at the local level. In a policy area 
where many public and non-public actors are involved, the municipal administrations 
are responsible for coordinating public action. In seeking to make the local integration 
process work, each municipal administration faces the challenge of managing a complex 
network of actors as efficiently as possible. The focus of this comparative study is on the 
relationship between network management and the integration situation in the munici-
palities. Two hypotheses are tested in an empirical analysis which combines quantitative 
and qualitative techniques in a two-level design: that (1) local cooperation agreements and 
(2) high densities in the local implementation networks are positive for integration. None 
of the hypotheses are supported empirically. Network management does not matter – a 
result which calls into question the high attention and priority that network solutions get 
in present-day public administration. 
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Introduction
Public sector reform over the last 
decades has made networks and net-
work management increasingly impor-
tant. when implementing policy, gov-
ernments of today do not rely as heavily 
as before on hierarchical structures of 
command and control. Instead, imple-
mentation is more and more taking the 
form of steering dynamic networks that 
have vertical as well as horizontal com-
ponents. Governments still exercise 
power, but in a network setting this is 
mainly done by means of persuasion, 
negotiation and coordination. Modern-
day public network management is in 
fact not very dissimilar to conducting 
an orchestra (Kjaer 2004; Salamon 2002, 
p 9–18).
At the same time, the integration 
issue has moved higher and higher on 
political agendas across the globe. The 
international population movements 
of the post-Cold war era have affected 
almost every corner of the earth. Send-
ing countries cope with such things 
as brain drain and remittances, while 
receiving countries handle the sensi-
tive challenge of smoothly integrating 
a steady stream of newcomers into 
society. Since nearly one tenth of the 
inhabitants in the developed nations 
are now international immigrants, the 
integration task has become vital and 
is therefore a central feature of political 
life (Castles & Miller 2003; Sales 2007, 
p 7–11).
when it comes to integration policy 
in Sweden, implementation primar-
ily takes place at the local level. In a 
policy area where many public and 
non-public actors are involved, the 
municipal administrations have the 
overall responsibility for coordinating 
public action.1 Public bodies at dif-
ferent levels, health care institutions, 
housing providers, the civil society and 
the business community together make 
up a complex network of actors which 
the municipal administrations need to 
manage in seeking to make the local 
integration process work. Network 
management is not only part of every-
day life for the municipal administra-
tions, it is also an aspect that has con-
sistently been underlined in national 
policy development in the area. The 
main strategy for policy enhancement 
has been to try to strengthen coopera-
tion and a key element in that strategy 
has been to create formal local coop-
eration agreements between the actors 
involved in the policy-delivery phase. 
The focus of this study is on the rela-
tionship between network management 
and the integration situation in the 
Swedish municipalities. Does the way 
in which a municipal administration 
manages its integration policy network 
have an effect on the degree of integra-
tion in the local community? Is there a 
relationship between how networks are 
managed and the integration outcome? 
Does network management matter?
Two features are salient when it 
comes to the overall design of the 
study. The first is the comparative 
methodology. The study is basically 
about comparing circumstances and 
experiences across the municipalities 
in a structured way. The second feature 
is the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative techniques in a two-level 
analysis. The integration dynamics in 
the municipalities is analysed at two 
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levels: the aggregate and the specific. 
At the aggregate level, all 290 munici-
palities are included in a quantitative 
analysis of general patterns. Statistical 
techniques give a picture of the effect 
of variations in network management 
on local integration outcomes. At the 
specific level, a qualitative analysis of 
four strategically selected municipali-
ties complements the aggregate analy-
sis. Through a series of interviews, 
the impact of local network manage-
ment on integration is studied in more 
detail.2
This translates into a seven-step 
structure of the article. Following this 
introduction, the second step is a brief 
overview of Swedish integration policy 
implementation. The third step is an 
account of the public administration 
literature on networks. Based on the 
theoretical discussion, two hypotheses 
to be tested empirically are defined. In 
the fourth step, some key methodologi-
cal issues are dealt with. The fifth step, 
in which the general pattern across all 
municipalities is studied in a multiple 
regression analysis, is followed by the 
sixth step, in which four municipalities, 
selected on the basis of the results of the 
regression analysis, are studied more 
closely. Finally, conclusions are drawn 
and the contribution of the study is put 
into perspective. 
2. The implementation 
of Swedish integration 
policy
Swedish integration policy is essen-
tially implemented at the local level. 
The municipal administrations are in 
charge of the key elements of the policy: 
the introduction programme for newly 
arrived refugees and the language 
training programme for immigrants in 
general. 
The introduction programme aims at 
providing the participants with qualifi-
cations to live and work in Sweden on 
equal terms with the natives (Proposi-
tion 1997/98:16, p 82). The core compo-
nents are language training, internships 
and a general orientation about Swed-
ish society. The programme is normally 
24 months long and mainly financed by 
the national government through a sys-
tem of grants. The municipal adminis-
trations can add their own resources to 
the national grants, but the grants cover 
all basic expenses. The administrations 
can also let other immigrants than refu-
gees participate, but since the grants are 
restricted to the refugee group, most 
administrations primarily involve refu-
gees in the programme (SOU 2008:58, 
p 319–24). Given that from 1980 to 
2005 about one third of all immigrants 
receiving a permanent residence permit 
in Sweden were refugees, this means 
that the scope of the programme is 
actually somewhat limited (Sjögren & 
Zenou 2007, p 8). To be eligible for the 
grants, the municipal administrations 
must make an individual introduction 
plan for each programme participant. 
For all participants old enough to work, 
the local office of the Public Employ-
ment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen) is 
to be consulted when making the plan 
(Finansdepartementet 2007, p 100).
The language training programme, 
Swedish for Immigrants (SFI), is a 
sequence of courses where most stu-
dents start as beginners and the objec-
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tive is to end up fluent in Swedish. Any-
one who was born abroad and is at least 
16 years old can join the programme, 
which is financed by the municipal 
administrations partly through intro-
duction programme grants, partly 
through the municipal budget (Finans-
departementet 2007, p 112).
In taking care of the delivery of 
these two programmes, the municipal 
administrations are also responsible 
for coordinating the activities of all 
public actors involved in the area. The 
municipal administrations are to make 
sure that public action is coherent and 
that refugees and other immigrants 
get the assistance they need. In doing 
so, the administrations have an interest 
in working actively not only with pub-
lic actors, but with various non-public 
actors as well. The administrations can 
therefore be described as local inte-
gration network managers. National 
authorities and regional public bodies 
have their specific responsibilities, but 
it is largely up to the municipal admin-
istrations to make things work (SOU 
2008:58, p 319–24; Emilsson 2008, p 
10–14). 
One repeatedly identified problem 
in Swedish integration policy, however, 
is a lack of cooperation between differ-
ent public actors. National authorities, 
regional bodies and municipal admin-
istrations have been bad at coordinat-
ing their actions. Therefore, in seeking 
to improve policy performance, a core 
strategy in the last ten years has been to 
try to strengthen cooperation (Emilsson 
2008, p 17–22). 
This has primarily been done 
through a series of cooperation agree-
ments between the main actors 
involved. At the initiative of the Inte-
gration Board (Integrationsverket), the 
process started in 2001 with the signing 
of a central cooperation agreement. The 
agreement was seen as a platform from 
which cooperation routines could be 
developed and it had as a core objec-
tive to stimulate the creation of similar 
agreements at the regional and local 
levels. It was intended to function 
as a pattern for concrete action in the 
regions and municipalities (Integra-
tionsverket et al 2005, p 17–22; SOU 
2008:58, p 97–99).3 In fact, its signals 
were well received and a lot of activ-
ity was initiated. In 2005, there were 15 
regional as well as 102 local agreements 
all over the country (Integrationsverket 
et al 2005, p 5–6). 
The contents of the local agreements 
vary across the municipalities. A com-
mon feature is that the agreements 
establish a structure for the cooperation 
effort by defining the roles and respon-
sibilities of the different actors. Many 
of the local cooperation agreements are 
labour market oriented. In addition to 
the municipal administrations, which 
are the key actors, the local offices of 
the Public Employment Service (PES) 
are very often in a main role. These two 
actors were involved in almost all of the 
agreements that had been crafted up to 
2005 and are the actors with the most 
concrete responsibilities vis-à-vis the 
newly arrived immigrants. while the 
municipal administrations manage the 
introduction and SFI programmes, the 
PES has the job to facilitate the entry 
of immigrants into the labour market. 
As to other actors, the Migration Board 
(Migrationsverket) was involved in 
62 of the agreements existing in 2005, 
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the County Councils (Landstingen), in 
charge of health care, were involved 
in 10, the Social Insurance Agency 
(Försäkringskassan) was involved in 
four, while trade unions and local busi-
ness communities were represented in 
three agreements each (Integrations-
verket et al 2005, p 26–28, 33–38; SOU 
2008:58, p 99).
3. Networks and 
network management
The issue of networks and network 
management has received quite a 
large amount of attention in the public 
administration literature over the last 
decades. Governance is the key concept 
in a growing body of academic work. 
while the concept is applied in many 
contexts, it is often used to draw atten-
tion to the changing roles of govern-
ments. Public sector reform since the 
1980s, in combination with an increas-
ing complexity in society in general, has 
made governing a more complicated 
task than before. Instead of relying on 
traditional hierarchical structures of 
authority and control, governments 
make more and more use of networks 
in policy implementation. The concept 
of governance has been defined in dif-
ferent ways, but a common feature in 
most definitions is this network per-
spective (Kjaer 2004; Salamon 2002, p 
9–18). As Rhodes (1996, p 658) puts it: 
“Governance is about managing net-
works”.
when hierarchies are replaced by 
networks, governments need to change 
the way they act. Steering a network is 
not the same thing as steering a verti-
cally structured bureaucracy. Follow-
ing Salamon, the hierarchical approach 
of command and control has to be 
replaced by a network method focus-
ing on dialogue, negotiation and per-
suasion. In order for policy delivery 
through networks to be effective, gov-
ernments have to be good at activating 
the actors in the network, coordinating 
the actions and giving the individual 
actors the right incentives to contrib-
ute positively to the cooperation effort 
(Salamon 2002, p. 15–18).
when studying the implementa-
tion of integration policy in Sweden, 
the general governance perspective is 
highly relevant. In addition, there is 
a need to look more closely into what 
networks do and how the management 
of them affects policy outcomes. How 
can we empirically analyse the effects 
of municipal network management on 
integration?
Related to and partly overlapping 
the governance agenda, research on net-
works has been carried out within the 
framework of implementation theory. 
Some of this research deals with imple-
mentation situations that are similar to 
those in the integration policy area in 
the municipalities and there are at least 
several relevant studies looking into 
the effectiveness aspect (O’Toole 2000). 
However, before going into the details 
of the empirical analysis, two points 
need to be made.
First, the issue of network effective-
ness has not been very thoroughly stud-
ied. There is broad agreement – in the 
governance literature and elsewhere 
– that networks are increasingly impor-
tant in policy implementation, but this 
has not brought about very much of 
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academic activity focusing on effec-
tiveness. Provan & Kenis (2007, p 229) 
note that “there is still a considerable 
discrepancy between the acclamation 
and attention networks receive and the 
knowledge we have about the overall 
functioning of networks”.4 According 
to Provan & Milward (2001), one reason 
for this is probably that cooperation 
often is considered to be something 
intrinsically good. we are inclined to 
think that if actors work together in 
networks, the outcome is almost per 
definition better than if they work on 
their own. when discussing the organi-
sation of service delivery in the health 
and human sectors, this belief is par-
ticularly solid. with clients that have 
multi-faceted problems and service 
providers that are often narrowly spe-
cialised, the case for networks seems 
convincing. Given this natural assump-
tion that networks are good, it is not 
surprising that there is a lack of stud-
ies that objectively investigate whether 
networks are in fact good or not. None-
theless, as pointed out by both Provan 
& Milward (2001) and Provan & Kenis 
(2007), it is indeed important to study if 
public-sector networks are effective and 
to learn more about the effectiveness of 
different types of networks. whether 
networks work or not – as well as how 
and where they work – are ultimately 
empirical questions. 
Second, the scarcity of knowledge is 
particularly troublesome when it comes 
to the link between cause and effect. 
There is not much in the way of well-
established causal theories in the field. 
To build the empirical analysis on a 
solid ground, we need a more a specific 
idea of what it is that makes networks 
effective or ineffective. There has to be 
a picture of the causal mechanism.
Overall, I find it sensible to say that 
there are two sides to networking. On 
the negative side, it takes time and 
resources to maintain network contacts. 
whatever the positive network effects 
are, they should always be compared 
to the size of the effort that is put into 
networking.5 
On the positive side, networking 
can have many benefits, which can be 
illustrated by turning to network the-
ory at the individual level in the field 
of sociology. Granovetter (1973, 1983), 
in a seminal article from 1973 and in 
later research, distinguishes between 
strong and weak interpersonal ties. 
Strong ties are the connections indi-
viduals have with a close group of fam-
ily and friends. weak ties are the more 
distant connections with acquaintances 
of different types, created for example 
in workplaces and associations. Gra-
novetter argues that weak ties are very 
important for knitting communities 
together. The weak ties function as 
bridges between different community 
groups. They are good channels of 
information and facilitate the build-
ing of trust. A community with a lot of 
weak ties can organize effectively for 
common goals. Communities with few 
weak ties, on the other hand, are not 
able to organise as effectively. without 
the weak tie bridges, those communi-
ties are too fragmented for successful 
concerted action. As an example, Gra-
novetter notes that one community 
in Boston back in the 50s and 60s was 
able to fight urban renewal making use 
of extensive weak ties, while another 
community, without those bridges, 
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was not even capable of forming an 
organisation to fight the renewal which 
ultimately made the community disap-
pear.
Slightly modifying Granovetter’s 
argument, one could say that there in 
public administration exist strong ties, 
knitting the different actors together 
internally, and weak ties, connecting 
the actors to each other. If there are 
extensive weak ties between the actors 
in a network, there are good channels 
for information, a relatively high level 
of trust and a capability to act in a con-
certed way when needed. If the weak 
ties are few, on the contrary, important 
information is not shared, there are 
limited opportunities to build trust and 
there are few established contacts to use 
in a situation when coordination is nec-
essary. Accordingly, effective network 
management is about building interor-
ganisational bridges that can be used 
for information as well as cooperation. 
In a successful network, the benefits of 
the weak tie bridges are more substan-
tial than the costs needed to build and 
maintain them.
Regarding the details of the empiri-
cal analysis, two American studies can 
give further guidance on what is a suit-
able design. In a 1995 study, Provan & 
Milward investigate the relationship 
between interorganisational networks 
and the effectiveness of service-deliv-
ery, while Jennings & Ewalt, in a study 
from 1998, analyse the importance of 
interorganisational coordination for 
policy performance. 
The Provan & Milward study (1995) 
is a comprehensive comparison of the 
networks involved in the care of the 
mentally ill in four American cities. 
Provan & Milward map the service-
delivery systems in each of the four 
cities very thoroughly, including all 
actors that somehow have to do with 
the care of and services to these clients. 
As to the measurement of the network 
characteristics in the four cities, they 
focus on two dimensions: density and 
centralisation. Density is the extent 
to which the actors in the networks 
are interconnected. Centrality is the 
extent to which the network is centred 
around a dominant actor. In practice, 
Provan & Milward create a picture of 
the network characteristics by means 
of asking every network actor about 
the nature and frequency of its contacts 
with the other actors in the network. 
The results of the study are not very 
clear-cut, but there are two tendencies 
as regards the network variables. First, 
centralisation seems to be positive for 
network effectiveness. Second, the data 
does not support the assumption that 
higher network density leads to better 
network effectiveness.
The focus of the Jennings & Ewalt 
study (1998) is a job training pro-
gramme, JTPA, which is implemented 
by a special state-level JTPA agency. 
This agency is responsible for the deliv-
ery of the services of the programme at 
the local level. Since other state agencies 
have responsibilities as well within the 
area of employment and work training, 
it is crucial that the JTPA coordinates its 
activities with those actors. Particularly 
important is the cooperation with the 
state employment service. Two hypoth-
eses are tested. First, Jennings & Ewalt 
assume that increased levels of coordi-
nation bring about better programme 
performance. Coordination is measured 
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by counting the number of coordina-
tion tools, out of more than 40 avail-
able, that are used by the JTPA agencies 
in the different states to promote coop-
eration between the state and local level 
actors involved in the programme. Sec-
ond, they assume that administrative 
consolidation of the JTPA agency and 
the state employment service, placing 
them within the same administrative 
unit, leads to improved performance. 
Through a quantitative analysis, Jen-
nings & Ewalt reach the conclusion that 
administrative consolidation is clearly 
beneficial for programme performance, 
while increased levels of coordination 
have a modest positive effect on the 
programme outcome.
Drawing on these studies, two inter-
esting hypotheses can be formulated. 
First, the Jennings & Ewalt discussion 
on administrative consolidation is rel-
evant for the analysis of networking in 
the Swedish municipalities. The use of 
local cooperation agreements can be 
seen as a form of consolidation. while it 
is not about bringing actors together in 
the same administrative unit, it is defi-
nitely about formally bringing actors 
closer to one another in a structured 
network. Referring to Granovetter, it is 
about building weak tie bridges. Since 
consolidation made a difference in 
the Jennings & Ewalt study and since 
the basic idea behind the cooperation 
agreements is that they will be posi-
tive for the introduction as well as the 
integration process, this is a key net-
work aspect to study. As some munici-
pal administrations have cooperation 
agreements while others have not, the 
following hypothesis is a natural start-
ing point:
Hypothesis 1 
Local cooperation agreements are positive for 
the integration situation in the municipali-
ties. Municipal administrations that work 
with such agreements achieve better inte-
gration outcomes than those who do not.
Second, I find the Provan & Mil-
ward concept of network density – the 
extent to which the actors in a network 
are interconnected – to be relevant and 
applicable. It is also related to the Gra-
novetter discussion on the extensiveness 
of weak ties and the Jennings & Ewalt 
discussion on levels of coordination. 
Although density does not have a clear 
impact on network effectiveness in the 
Provan & Milward study, it is a network 
aspect that most of us would probably 
assume to be important. Our inclination 
to think that networking is good quite 
logically includes the idea that denser 
networks are better. In addition, refer-
ring to the cooperation agreements and 
the general emphasis on collaboration 
in the development of Swedish inte-
gration policy, the carrying idea is that 
more intensive networking is good for 
the integration outcome. Consequently, 
network density is the second network 
aspect to be studied. Despite the Provan 
& Milward results, I think that the most 
sensible starting-point is to assume that 
high density is positive for the policy 
outcome.6 
Hypothesis 2
High density in the policy implementa-
tion network is positive for the integration 
situation in the municipalities. The higher 
density that the municipal administrations 
maintain in their integration networks, the 
better is the integration outcome.
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4. Methodological 
considerations
The first hypothesis is tested in a 
regression analysis. The key question 
is whether municipal administrations 
with local cooperation agreements 
achieve better integration outcomes 
than those without. Since there are a 
number of factors other than coopera-
tion agreements that could affect the 
integration outcome, several of those 
factors are included as control variables 
in the analysis. One category of such 
control factors has to do with all the 
other things, apart from networking, 
that the municipal administrations do 
when implementing integration policy. 
How the municipal administrations 
carry out these tasks can also have an 
impact on integration. The other cat-
egory of control factors has to do with 
the general integration policy environ-
ment in the municipalities. Included in 
this category are more general factors 
that can influence the integration out-
come.
An accurate measure of integration 
needs to be constructed. To get an anal-
ysis that is concise and manageable, I 
make use of only one integration mea-
sure. The focus in Swedish integration 
policy is to a large extent on the labour 
market. Many of the local cooperation 
agreements are labour market oriented 
and most of the day-to-day work in the 
introduction programme is about mak-
ing the participants able to find and 
keep a job. Accordingly, it seems sen-
sible to opt for a labour market integra-
tion measure. A good indicator of how 
well integrated the labour market is in 
a municipality is the difference between 
the unemployment rate in the foreign-
born group and the unemployment 
rate in the native population. I capture 
this difference by dividing the unem-
ployment rate among the foreign-born 
with the unemployment rate among 
natives. The resulting ratio is the mea-
sure of labour market integration and, 
by extension, of integration. The lower 
the ratio, the better is the labour mar-
ket position of the foreign-born and the 
better is thus the integration situation 
in the municipality. Comparing the 
unemployment rates of foreign-born 
and natives is an often used method to 
measure labour market integration (see 
for example Pedersen 2005, Brekke and 
Borchgrevink 2007, p 33, and OECD 
2007, p 71–72). The exact unemploy-
ment rate ratio measure is taken from 
studies by Kogan (2006) and Bauer et 
al (2001).7
In setting up the regression analysis, 
data scarcity is a general problem. In 
some fields, the data situation is accept-
able, but in other fields, particularly 
when it comes to details on the activities 
the municipal administrations carry out 
in the integration area, not much in the 
way of comparable data is available. As 
a consequence, some of the indicators 
in the analysis are relatively rough.8
The selection of municipalities to be 
included in the qualitative analysis is 
based on the results of the regression 
analysis. Those results show what fac-
tors are of importance for the integra-
tion situation. The selection strategy 
is to choose municipalities that (1) are 
as similar as possible when it comes 
to the factors that are important for 
integration, but that at the same time 
(2) are different regarding the integra-
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tion outcome. In this way, a most simi-
lar system design is combined with a 
selection based on known variations 
in the dependent variable. Given the 
interest in getting information from as 
many municipalities as possible, on 
the one hand, and the limitations when 
it comes to time and resources on the 
other, four municipalities are selected.9 
There are two keys to making this 
design work. First, the municipalities 
must be selected so that there are broad 
variations in the integration variable. If 
the variations are small, it is difficult to 
correctly assess the causal effect. Sec-
ond, the municipalities have to be 
similar as to the important explana-
tory variables that are theoretically 
held constant. The municipalities can-
not be identical in this regard, but the 
closer the similarities, the stronger are 
the conclusions that can be drawn (Esa-
iasson et al 2007, p 114–115; King et al 
1994, p 129–133).
In order to test the second hypoth-
esis, the integration networks managed 
by the municipal administrations are 
studied in the four selected munici-
palities. The analytical model, shown 
in figure 1, is based on the Provan & 
Milward methodology. To simplify, I 
concentrate on what can be seen as the 
ten most important network actors and 
I only study contacts that the municipal 
administrations are involved in. 
within the municipal administra-
tion, which is in the core role, I focus on 
the introduction unit. In most admin-
istrations, a special unit has the main 
responsibility for refugee reception in 
general, including the activities within 
the introduction and SFI programmes. 
while named differently across the 
municipalities, I use the term intro-
duction unit. The other ten actors in 
the model are selected on the basis of 
a close analysis of the implementation 
networks that the municipal admin-
istrations manage. The Migration 
Board, the County Council, the County 
Administrative Board (Länsstyrelsen), 
the Social Insurance Agency and the 
PES are public actors whose activities 
are important for the refugees. Except 
for the County Administrative Boards, 
which assist the Migration Board in 
managing refugee flows to the munici-
palities, these actors are all involved in 
at least some of the local cooperation 
agreements.10 The trade unions and 
the business community are also part 
of several agreements. In the original 
guidelines for the introduction pro-
gramme, civil society is pointed out 
as an actor, or group of actors, that the 
municipal administration should be 
closely connected with (Proposition 
1997/98:16, p 81). Moreover, I have 
added the housing companies, which 
the municipal administrations need to 
cooperate with to find housing solu-
tions for the refugees, and adult educa-
tion associations, which are a good way 
for refugees to familiarise themselves 
with Swedish society. I identify one 
actor as being more important than the 
others: the local office of the PES. The 
PES offices are involved in almost all 
local cooperation agreements and there 
is a general focus in the introduction 
programme on making the participants 
capable of getting a job. Thus, I believe 
that the contact with the local PES office 
is the key network relationship for the 
municipal administrations.
Between the municipal administra-
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tion and each of the ten actors, there 
can be a solid network contact – a con-
tact that is regular, relatively frequent 
and of at least some value to the par-
ties involved. Referring to Granovet-
ter, a solid network contact is a weak 
tie between two organisations. I assess 
network density in a straight-forward 
Figure 1. Analytical model of the integration policy implementation network.
way, including two components in the 
density assessment. First, the general 
measurement rule is simple: the larger 
the number of solid network contacts, 
the higher is the density. Second, the 
solidness of the key contact with the 
PES is given extra weight when the 
total network density is determined.
Local office of the
Public Employment
Service
Local office of the
Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency
Swedish Migration 
Board
County Council
health care institutions
County Administrative
Board
Local housing 
companies
Local trade union
representatives
Local business
community
Local civil society
Adult education
associations active
locally
Municipal
administration
Introduction unit
The networks are mapped accord-
ing to the analytical model in a series of 
interviews. Two interviews are made in 
each of the four municipalities: one with 
the head of the introduction unit and 
one with the head of the local office of 
the PES. In measuring the network den-
sity in each of the municipalities, the cri-
teria that I utilize to determine whether 
a network contact is solid or not are the 
following: there must be (1) established 
routines, (2) regular exchanges at least 
once a month and (3) a decent quality 
in the contact – it must not be described 
as bad by any of the respondents. Con-
tacts that meet all three criteria are con-
sidered to be solid. Contacts that do not 
meet all criteria are not solid.11 
Finally, I find it sensible to use 
rather tough criteria when determining 
whether the second hypothesis is sup-
ported or not. For it to be convincingly 
supported, the observed relationship 
between density and integration among 
the four selected municipalities has to 
be fully in line with expectations.
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5. Multiple regression 
analysis
To start with, figure 2 illustrates the 
integration situation across the munici-
palities. Overall, labour market integra-
tion in Sweden is not very good. In 286 
out of 290 municipalities, the immigrant 
unemployment rate is higher or radi-
cally higher than the unemployment 
rate in the native population. In most 
municipalities, the immigrant rates are 
around two to three times higher than 
those of the natives.
David Ljung
Figure 2. Frequency distribution for the integration variable: the foreign-born / 
native unemployment rate ratio.
Mean = 2,55. Standard deviation = 0,88. N = 290. Source: Arbetsförmedlingen.
Foreign-born/native unemployment ratio 2008
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Table 1 lists all variables included 
in the regression analysis. A few expla-
nations are needed. As to attitudes 
towards immigration, there is no com-
parable public opinion survey data at 
the municipal level, which is why I use 
the support for the xenophobic Sweden 
Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) as 
an indirect measure. The cultural dis-
tance variable builds on the assumption, 
derived from human capital theory, that 
immigrants from countries that are cul-
turally distant from Sweden – in terms of 
for example language, social habits and 
educational system – find it more dif-
ficult to integrate into Swedish society 
than those from countries that are closer 
in this sense. The Asian and African 
immigrant groups are seen as culturally 
most distant in the operationalisation 
of this variable. As regards the number 
of refugees variable, it is incorporated 
into the analysis as a series of dummy 
variables. Because it is not normally dis-
tributed in its original version – which 
it at least approximately has to be in a 
regression analysis – it is transformed 
first into an ordinal level variable with 
five categories and then into a series of 
four dummy variables.12 In the regres-
sion analysis, the b-values of the dummy 
variables indicate how much higher or 
lower the average unemployment ratios 
of each of the categories – low, medium, 
high and very high – are in relation to 
that of the very low category.13
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Table 1. Variables included in the multiple regression analysis.
Variable Definition Source
Key variables
Integration Degree of integration in the labour market. Unemploy-
ment rate foreign-born / Unemployment rate natives 
(2008). The average of three monthly unemployment 
rate observations – April, July and October – is calcu-
lated for both foreign-born and natives. The average 
rate for the foreign-born is then divided by the average 
rate for natives. The data refers to persons aged 
16-64, not including those enrolled in public labour 
market activity programmes.
Arbetsförmedlingen.
Local cooperation 
agreement
Whether or not there existed a formal local  
cooperation agreement in June 2005.  
1 = Yes, 0 = No.
Integrationsverket et 
al 2005.
Policy environment
Population size The logarithm of population size. Total population in 
the municipality in 2006 (31/12).
SCB.
Tax paying capacity Taxable income from gainful employment. SEK per 
inhabitant in the municipality. Average of the annual 
figures in 2006-2008 (referring to the taxations in 
2005-2007).
Kommundatabasen.
Unemployment level Total unemployment level in the municipality (%). Per-
sons aged 16-64, not including those enrolled in public 
labour market activity programmes. Average of the 
annual average unemployment rates in 2005-2007.
Arbetsförmedlingen.
Attitudes towards 
immigration
Support within the municipality for the Sweden 
Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) in the 2006 national 
election (%).
Valmyndigheten.
Cultural distance Foreign-born population from Africa and Asia as a 
percentage of the total foreign-born population in the 
municipality (%). 2006 (31/12).
SCB 2007.
Size of the immigrant 
community
Foreign-born population as a percentage of total popu-
lation in the municipality (%). 2006 (31/12).
SCB.
Policy implementation
Number of refugees 
received
Total number of refugees received 2003-2007 per 1000 
inhabitants in the municipality. Based on the 2006 
population size.
Migrationsverket. SCB.
Resources: Total Total net cost for refugee reception in the municipality 
in relation to the number of refugees received 2003-
2007. The net costs for each of the five years are 
added together and then divided by the total number of 
refugees received over those five years.
Kommundatabasen.  
Migrationsverket.
Resources: SFI Costs for the SFI programme. SEK per full-time stu-
dent. Average of the costs in 2005-2007. 
Skolverket.
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Table 2. Multiple regression analysis to explain the degree of integration of im-
migrants in the Swedish municipalities.14
Sources are indicated in table 1.
Dependent
Integration
Foreign-born / native unemploy-
ment ratio
Multiple
Environment
b (p)
Multiple
Environment
Implement.
b (p)
Multiple
Environment
Implement.
Network
b (p)
Multiple
Environment
Implement.
Network
Beta 
Policy environment
Population size 0,42
(0,02)
0,53
(0,00)
0,51
(0,01)
0,23
Tax paying capacity -1,2E-5
(0,00)
-8,7E-6
(0,03)
-8,7E-6
(0,03)
-0,17
Unemployment level -0,26
(0,00)
-0,28
(0,00)
-0,28
(0,00)
-0,31
Attitudes towards 
immigration
0,03
(0,34)
0,02
(0,62)
0,02
(0,60)
0,03
Cultural distance 3,58
(0,00)
2,52
(0,00)
2,48
(0,00)
0,28
Size of the immigrant
community
-0,01
(0,21)
-0,03
(0,02)
-0,03
(0,02)
-0,16
Policy implementation
Number of refugees received 
- Dummy, very low vs. low
- Dummy, very low vs. medium
- Dummy, very low vs. high
- Dummy, very low vs. very high
-0,02 
(0,92)
0,31 
(0,06)
0,19 
(0,25)
0,50 
(0,01)
-0,03 
(0,87)
0,21 
(0,08)
0,18 
(0,31)
0,48 
(0,01)
-0,01
0,13
0,08
0,22
Resources: Total 3,2E-7  
(0,60)
3,2E-7  
(0,60)
0,03
Resources: SFI -2,9E-6 
(0,14)
-2,9E-6 
(0,14)
-0,08
Network management
Local cooperation agreement 0,06 
(0,63)
0,03
R² 0,22 0,27 0,27
Adjusted R² 0,20 0,23 0,23
F change 12,6 
(0,00)
2,63 
(0,02)
0,24 
(0,63)
N 272 272 272
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In the regression analysis, the vari-
ables are introduced in three steps. The 
policy environment variables make up 
the first model. I then add the policy 
implementation factors to the environ-
ment factors and get the second model. 
In the third model, the local coopera-
tion agreement variable is included 
alongside all the other variables. In 
this step-wise way, the impact of the 
cooperation agreements can be seen in 
relation to the importance of the policy 
environment and policy implementa-
tion categories. 
The regression results are presented 
in table 2. Starting with the first model, 
four of the policy environment variables 
have significant effects on the integra-
tion outcome (p < 0,05). Only attitudes 
towards immigration and size of the immi-
grant community are non-significant. 
The model as a whole explains 22% of 
the variation in integration across the 
municipalities (R² = 0,22). It is obvious 
that the policy environment is of cen-
tral importance for the municipal inte-
gration dynamics. 
Population size as well as cultural 
distance have positive effects on the 
unemployment ratio and thus negative 
effects on integration. The larger the 
municipality, the weaker the integra-
tion outcome (b = 0,42). The longer the 
cultural distance, the poorer the inte-
gration situation (b = 3,58). Regarding 
tax paying capacity, the significant effect 
is that integration tends to be easier 
in municipalities where the tax pay-
ing capacity is high (b = –1,2E-5). In 
contrast to these clear effects, neither 
attitudes (p = 0,34) nor the size of the 
immigrant community (p = 0,21) are of 
importance in this model. 
while these results are straight-for-
ward, the unemployment level variable is 
somewhat confusing. The unemploy-
ment level actually has a negative effect 
on the unemployment ratio and conse-
quently a positive effect on integration 
(b = –0,26). The higher the unemploy-
ment level, the better the integration 
outcome. This result is somewhat sur-
prising and has to some extent to do 
with a “mathematical” measurement 
effect induced when using the ratio 
measure of integration. However, since 
the issue is complex and only applies 
to this variable, I will not delve deeper 
into it here. 
when the policy implementation 
variables are added in the second 
model, there is an increase in explana-
tory power (the F change statistic is 
significant), but the increase is small 
(adjusted R² only goes up from 0,20 to 
0,23). Evidently, policy implementation 
does not make much of a difference for 
integration.
Both resources variables are non-sig-
nificant. Total resources is far from being 
significant (p = 0,60). SFI resources is 
closer to significance, but still not signif-
icant (p = 0,14). Contrary to what could 
be expected, the size of the resources 
that are spent on integration activities 
seems to be of very limited importance 
for the integration outcome. As to the 
number of refugees received, the picture 
is mixed. If there had been a clear 
positive effect of refugee numbers on 
the unemployment ratio, the b-value 
of the first dummy would have been 
positive and the b-values of dummies 
2-4 would then have increased step-
by-step. That is not the case. There is 
a significant difference in integration 
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between the very low and the very 
high group, with the group with very 
low refugee numbers in general having 
a better integration situation (b = 0,50, 
p = 0,01). But the b-value of the first 
dummy is in fact slightly negative (b 
= –0,02) and the b-value of the second 
dummy (b = 0,31) is higher than that of 
the third dummy (b = 0,19). The very 
general trend is that higher numbers of 
refugees lead to higher unemployment 
ratios and thus worse integration out-
comes, but there are deviations from 
that trend. 
Also in the second model, the size 
of the immigrant community, which was 
non-significant in the first model, is 
now significant in the company of the 
policy implementation variables. The 
larger the immigrant community, the 
better is the integration situation (b = 
–0,03).
The key cooperation agreement 
variable is tested when added to the 
other variables in the third model. As 
we can see, local cooperation agreement 
does not make a difference for the over-
all explanatory power (the F change 
statistic is non-significant) and it is far 
from having a significant effect on inte-
gration (p = 0,63). At odds with what 
was assumed, whether or not there is 
a cooperation agreement does not have 
an impact on the integration situation 
in the municipalities. It is even the case 
that the sign of the b-value (b = 0,06) 
is the opposite of what was expected. 
If the agreements would have been 
good for the integration outcome, the 
b-value would have been negative. 
However, since the b-value is clearly 
non-significant, the contrary conclu-
sion, that cooperation agreements are 
bad for integration, can not be drawn. 
what can be said is that the agreements 
are neither good nor bad.
Consequently, the first hypothesis 
does not get any support in the regres-
sion analysis. Municipal administra-
tions that work with local cooperation 
agreements do not achieve better inte-
gration outcomes than those who do 
not.
In the fifth column, the standardised 
b-values, Beta, are given for all inde-
pendent variables, which makes it pos-
sible to compare effects. Unemployment 
level (Beta = –0,31) and cultural distance 
(0,28) have the strongest effects on 
the integration outcome, followed by 
population size (0,23), tax paying capac-
ity (–0,17) and size of the immigrant com-
munity (–0,16). As to the number of refu-
gees received, the picture of the effect is 
mixed, while the rest of the explanatory 
variables are non-significant.
The influence of outlier cases is 
tested by removing the four munici-
palities with the most extreme integra-
tion outcomes – in relation to what the 
regression model predicts – and then 
rerunning the analysis. The outlier 
problem is limited. without the outli-
ers, the effect of tax paying capacity is 
not as solid as it appears in the original 
analysis and the impact of the number 
of refugees variable is more marked than 
when the outliers are included.
In all, the conclusions of the regres-
sions analysis can be summarised in 
three points:
(1) The cooperation agreements do 
not affect the integration situation in 
the municipalities. The local coopera-
tion agreements are neither good nor 
bad for the integration process, which 
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means that the first hypothesis does not 
get any support in the analysis. 
(2) The policy environment is impor-
tant for the integration outcome. Three 
policy environment factors have 
strong and solid effects on integration: 
population size, unemployment level and 
cultural distance. Regarding popula-
tion size, the trend is that the integra-
tion situation in small municipalities 
tends to be better than in larger ones. 
A sensible interpretation could be that 
the closeness and informal ways of 
small municipalities are favourable to 
integration.15 As to cultural distance, 
municipalities where large shares of 
the immigrants are from Africa or Asia 
tend to have more serious integration 
problems than municipalities where 
those shares are smaller. when it comes 
to the unemployment level, the sur-
prising effect is that higher levels lead 
to better integration, but the interpre-
tation of that result is to some extent 
a matter for discussion. Two more fac-
tors are of importance as well, but they 
are not as solid as the other three. Tax 
paying capacity has a positive effect on 
integration. The richer the municipal-
ity, the better the integration situation. 
This factor, though, is sensitive to the 
influence of outlier cases. The size of the 
immigrant community also has a posi-
tive impact on the degree of integra-
tion. It seems that large immigrant net-
works make it easier for immigrants 
to integrate into society. This factor, 
however, is only significant when the 
policy implementation variables are 
included in the analysis.
(3) The policy implementation factors 
are not that important for the integration 
outcome. Policy implementation, as it 
is measured in this analysis, does not 
have more than a limited impact on 
integration. The number of refugees 
received in the municipalities tends to 
have an effect on the integration situa-
tion, although that effect is not unam-
biguous. Higher numbers generally 
make integration more difficult. The 
size of the resources that the municipal 
administrations put into their integra-
tion efforts, on the other hand, is virtu-
ally unimportant. Neither total nor SFI 
resources affect the degree of integra-
tion. Money does not seem to make a 
difference.
6. Networks and 
integration in four 
municipalities
we now have a good picture of which 
factors are important for the integration 
outcome. Population size, unemployment 
level and cultural distance have strong 
and solid effects. Tax paying capacity 
and the size of the immigrant community 
have impacts that are less solid, while 
the number of refugees received is of some 
importance. Since we are also fami-
liar with the integration outcomes, the 
selection can be made. 
when carefully studying the varia-
tions of these variables across all 290 
municipalities, I find four municipali-
ties that fit very well into the sought-
after pattern: Karlskrona, Uddevalla, 
Örnsköldsvik and Östersund. As far 
as I can see, this is the best selection of 
municipalities that can be made com-
bining similarity in the independent 
variables with clear variation in the 
dependent variable. 
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Table 3. Selection of municipalities. Scores for the four selected municipalities 
on the seven variables involved in the selection. The distributions of those vari-
ables are illustrated by the min, max, 1st quartile, median and 3rd quartile values.
Sources are indicated in table 1.
 
Population 
size
Unemploy-
ment level
Cultural 
distance
Tax paying 
capacity
Number of
refugees
Size of the 
immigrant 
community
Integration/
Unemploy-
ment ratio
Min 2 541 1,07 1,19 119 377 0 3,00 0,72
Örnskölds-
vik  
5,10
Östersund
5,30
1st quartile 10 006 2,67 15,4 133 584 3,17 5,98 1,93
Östersund
5,46
Karlskrona
7,70
Östersund
2,47
Median 15 236 3,23 21,5 140 097 6,91 8,30 2,47
Uddevalla
3,73
Uddevalla
141 957
Karlskrona
147 231
Östersund
147 999
Örnskölds-
vik
148 803
Örnskölds-
vik
9,16
Uddevalla
10,7
3rd quartile 32 507 3,93 29,7 148 809 10,9 11,1 3,10
Uddevalla
50 507
Örnskölds-
vik
55 243
Östersund
58 583
Karlskrona
61 844
Karlskrona
4,03
Örnskölds-
vik
4,03
Östersund
4,23
Uddevalla
31,1
Karlskrona
35,3
Östersund
37,1
Örnskölds-
vik
37,6
Karlskrona
11,4
Uddevalla
11,7
Uddevalla
3,40
Karlskrona
3,52
Örnskölds-
vik
4,68
Max 782 885 6,13 54,8 268 847 65,6 39,4 5,96
As illustrated in table 3, these munic-
ipalities are very close to one another 
regarding the three most important 
factors: population size, unemploy-
ment level and cultural distance. The 
differences in tax paying capacity are 
also very small. As to the number of 
refugees and the size of the immigrant 
community, the variations are larger, 
but still not very large if variations 
across all 290 municipalities are taken 
into consideration. In addition to these 
similarities in the independent vari-
ables, the dissimilarities in the integra-
tion outcomes are substantial.
An interesting interview result is 
that the experiences in the four munici-
palities indicate that the existence of 
a formal local cooperation agreement 
does not mean very much. Cooperation 
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agreements can be specific and substan-
tial tools, like it has been in Uddevalla 
since the old agreement was radically 
revised in 2007. But agreements can also 
be not much more than pieces of paper 
with limited impact in real life, like in 
Uddevalla in 2003–2006, in Örnskölds-
vik in 2005–2007 and in Östersund. 
whether there is a formal document or 
not does not seem to be of importance. 
what counts is how cooperation efforts 
are carried out in day-to-day activities, 
which has little to do with what is writ-
ten and agreed upon (Interviews with 
Loodh, Berggren, Richter, Sörstam, 
Eurenius and Tegnhed). This is the 
pattern in just four out of 290 munici-
palities, but it is nevertheless a clue to 
why the existence of cooperation agree-
ments does not have an effect on inte-
gration in the regression analysis. If the 
agreements are put into practice very 
differently across the municipalities, it 
is not surprising that they do not have 
a consistent impact on the integration 
situation.
Turning then to a comparison of net-
work densities, table 4 is an overview 
of the findings in the four municipali-
ties.
Table 4. Overview of the empirical findings in the selected municipalities:  
network density and the degree of integration.
Municipal  
administration
Network density 
Key contact with the Public 
Employment Service
Network density
Number of solid network 
contacts
Integration 
Unemployment ratio
Östersund Regular and active. The 
PES always involved in 
introduction plans. Both 
parties content with quality 
of contact.
8
All contacts solid except for 
the Social Insurance Agency 
and the trade unions.
2,47
Uddevalla Regular but not very active. 
The PES seldom involved 
in introduction plans. Both 
parties content with quality 
of contact.
5
Solid: the PES, the adult 
education associations, the 
business community, the 
trade unions and the County 
Council.
3,40
Karlskrona Regular and quite active. 
The PES often involved 
in introduction plans. The 
parties not very content with 
quality of contact.
5
Solid: the PES, the business 
community, the housing 
companies, the County 
Administrative Board and the 
County Council.
3,52
Örnsköldsvik Regular and active. The 
PES always involved in 
introduction plans. Both 
parties content with quality 
of contact.
4
Solid: the PES, the business 
community, the housing 
companies and the Migration 
Board.
 4,68
Sources: Interviews with Eurenius, Tegnhed, Loodh, Berggren, Fagerberg, Kihlström, Richter 
and Sörstam. Arbetsförmedlingen.
46 David Ljung
The approach to assessing overall 
network density is to look at the total 
number of solid network contacts, while 
giving extra weight to the solidness of 
the key contact with the PES. In line with 
this, it is obvious that Östersund, with 8 
solid network contacts and a very solid 
relationship with the PES, has the high-
est network density. Furthermore, with 
5 solid network contacts each and not 
so solid relationships with the PES, the 
networks in Uddevalla and Karlskrona 
are less dense than in Östersund. when 
comparing Uddevalla and Karlskrona, 
it is sensible to say that they are at the 
same density level. They have the same 
number of solid network contacts and 
their PES contacts are roughly compa-
rable. In relation to the PES, Karlskrona 
has higher activity, while the quality is 
higher in Uddevalla. Regarding Örn-
sköldsvik, there are only 4 solid con-
tacts in the network, in comparison 
with 5 in Uddevalla and Karlskrona, 
but the PES contact in Örnsköldsvik is 
more solid than in those two munici-
palities. As a consequence, a sensible 
overall assessment is that the network 
density in Uddevalla, Karlskrona and 
Örnsköldsvik is roughly the same. This 
leads to the conclusion that Östersund 
has a higher network density than the 
other three municipal administrations, 
which are at approximately the same 
density level.
On the basis of that conclusion, the 
relationship between density and inte-
gration can be scrutinized. Four issues 
are important when assessing the rela-
tionship: (1) co-variation, (2) the accu-
racy of the most similar system design, 
(3) the causal mechanism and (4) gen-
eralisation.
(1) The unemployment rate ratios are 
included in table 4. Overall, the empiri-
cal co-variation between density and 
integration is to a quite large extent in 
line with expectations. It is not perfect, 
but with the clear difference between 
Östersund and the other municipali-
ties, there is a general trend linking 
higher densities to better integration. 
Östersund, with the highest density, 
also has the best integration situation. 
what makes the picture look less than 
perfect is the case of Örnsköldsvik. 
Although density in Örnsköldsvik is 
at the same level as in Uddevalla and 
Karlskrona, the integration situation is 
much worse. The integration outcome 
in Örnsköldsvik can obviously not be 
explained by the density factor. In all, 
there is a trend in support of the sec-
ond hypothesis, but there is also a clear 
deviation from that trend. 
(2) The similarity argument is gen-
erally convincing. However, there is 
a problem with the differences in the 
number of refugees variable. Returning 
to table 3, Östersund received a smaller 
number of refugees than the other 
municipalities. Although the effect was 
somewhat ambiguous, the conclusion 
was that higher numbers generally 
make integration more difficult. Thus, 
the limited number of refugees received 
in Östersund can probably partially 
explain why the integration situation 
is better in Östersund than in the other 
municipalities. On the other hand, the 
analysis also showed that small immi-
grant communities are generally nega-
tive for the integration process, which 
means that the relatively small size of 
the Östersund community is negative 
for integration. Östersund’s advantage 
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from receiving few refugees is most 
likely more important than its disad-
vantage from having a small immi-
grant community, but to some extent 
the effects can be assumed to level each 
other out. The exact impact on integra-
tion of the two variables taken together 
is difficult to determine.
(3) Network management involves 
the negative aspect of using limited 
resources and the positive aspect of 
building interorganisational bridges 
which are used for information as well 
as cooperation. Overall in the four 
selected municipalities, the positive 
aspect is more salient than the negative 
aspect. 
On resources, the introduction unit 
respondents were asked about how 
much time they spent on managing 
external contacts. All four answered 
that they spent between 40% and 50% 
of their working hours on external net-
working. They found those activities to 
be important and no one indicated that 
the external time was not well-spent. 
Clearly, their perception is that the ben-
efits of maintaining these contacts are 
more substantial than the costs (Inter-
views with Eurenius, Fagerberg, Loodh 
and Richter).
On interorganisational bridges, there 
are good examples of the value of solid 
network contacts – or weak ties in the 
Granovetter terminology. First, on the 
information theme, in both Örnskölds-
vik and Östersund the close connec-
tions between the introduction units 
and the PES offices mean that the offices 
are well informed about and actively 
involved in the case of each individual 
refugee. If there are opportunities in the 
labour market, the PES offices can help 
the individuals take advantage of those 
opportunities without delay. In that 
way, information sharing through a 
solid network connection can make the 
integration process move faster (Inter-
views with Eurenius, Richter, Sörman 
and Tegnhed). Second, as an example 
of established ties making coopera-
tion easier, there is a contrast between 
Örnsköldsvik and the other municipal 
administrations when it comes to con-
tacts with the County Councils. Karlsk-
rona, Uddevalla and Östersund, which 
all have solid ties with the County 
Councils, face no major problems in 
finding health care solutions for the 
refugees. In Örnsköldsvik, on the con-
trary, where there is no solid network 
contact with the County Council, 
health care is a troublesome issue and 
the refugees can not always be offered 
the care they need in a timely manner. 
Since health care is very important for 
many refugees, this can be an obstacle 
in the integration process (Interviews 
with Eurenius, Fagerberg, Loodh and 
Richter).
This illustrates why it is logical that 
the introduction unit in Östersund, 
with the most dense network, can use 
its established ties to create opportuni-
ties for the refugees in more areas than 
what the units in the other municipali-
ties are capable of. A dense network can 
facilitate information sharing and coop-
eration in many fields, which makes it 
easier to find good practical solutions 
for the refugees, which in turn makes 
the integration process easier. Citing 
Granovetter (1973, p 1360), there is a 
“strength of weak ties”. 
(4) Taking into consideration the 
points made on co-variation, the accu-
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racy of the most similar system design 
and the causal mechanism – what can 
be said about the effect of network 
density on integration? Is the second 
hypothesis supported or not? 
On the one hand, there is a trend 
across the four municipalities in sup-
port of the hypothesis. Due to the influ-
ence of Östersund, the overall picture is 
that higher densities are linked to bet-
ter integration. There is a causal mecha-
nism that can logically explain the trend 
and the most similar system design 
seems reasonably solid. On the other 
hand, there is a clear deviation from the 
trend. The poor integration situation in 
Örnsköldsvik can not be explained by 
network density. Because of that devia-
tion, the trend is not strong enough for 
a conclusion to be drawn that there is 
a similar trend among all 290 munici-
palities. As has been argued, to say that 
high density is positive for integration 
across all municipalities would be sen-
sible only if the observed relationship 
is fully in line with expectations. That 
is not the case. Since the relationship 
is not entirely consistent among the 
four municipalities, it is not reasonable 
to assert that it should be consistent 
among all municipalities. Therefore, I 
conclude that the second hypothesis is 
not supported by the empirical results. 
High density is not positive for integra-
tion. At the same time, since the results 
do not indicate that high density is neg-
ative, the overall finding is that high 
density is neither good nor bad for inte-
gration. The network density level does 
not matter.
Accordingly, the conclusions of the 
qualitative study can be summarised in 
two points:
(1) High network density is not positive 
for integration. The second hypothesis 
does not get good enough empirical 
support to conclude that high density 
has a positive impact on integration. 
High density is neither good nor bad 
for the integration process.
(2) Network density does not seem to be 
unimportant among the four municipali-
ties. while the hypothesis is not sup-
ported across all municipalities, there is 
a trend linking higher densities to better 
integration among the four. Although 
the trend is not fully consistent, the 
difference between Östersund, with 
a dense network and strong integra-
tion, and the other municipalities, with 
lower densities and weaker integration, 
is an indication that density is of at least 
some importance. 
7. Conclusions
with none of the two hypotheses sup-
ported empirically, this leads up to the 
overall conclusion that there is no rela-
tionship between how networks are 
managed and the integration outcome. 
The way in which the municipal admi-
nistrations manage their implementa-
tion networks does not affect the local 
degree of integration. Network mana-
gement does not matter. 
That being said, two important 
limitations in the study should be 
noted. First, the mapping exercise gone 
through when measuring network 
density is not very extensive. Second, 
although integration is a multi-faceted 
phenomenon, a labour market indi-
cator is the only integration measure 
used in the study, making the perspec-
49Kommunal ekonomi och politik
tive rather narrow in this regard. what 
integration looks like in other areas 
of society, for example in political life 
or regarding housing patterns, is not 
taken into account.
Underlining the need for more 
research is surely a standard conclu-
sion in the academic world. In this 
case, however, I would argue that such 
a conclusion is particularly relevant. 
Referring again to Provan & Kenis, 
there is indeed a wide gap between the 
high priority that network solutions get 
in policy considerations and what we 
actually know about the functioning 
of networks. There is a lack of studies 
that look closer into the workings of 
public-sector networks and there is a 
striking lack of theories of cause and 
effect – of what makes networks work. 
Policy implementation is increasingly 
about governance and the steering of 
networks, but we really do not have a 
very good picture of what is going on 
or what the implications are.
One reason for the scarcity of knowl-
edge is probably that we are inclined to 
think that network solutions almost per 
definition are better than if actors work 
on their own. The results of this and 
other studies, however, indicate that 
extensive networking is not an auto-
matic problem-solver. The conclusion 
on network density – that higher den-
sities do not bring about better policy 
effects – is the same result on this aspect 
as in the Provan & Milward study. In the 
Jennings & Ewalt study the intensive-
ness of the cooperation efforts is mea-
sured differently, but the result is quite 
similar: increased levels of coopera-
tion are only slightly positive for pro-
gramme performance. while it seems 
plausible that higher density should 
result in higher effectiveness, the real 
world observations are not really in 
line with intuition on this point. Along 
the same lines, the conclusion that the 
local cooperation agreements are not 
positive for integration also runs coun-
ter to intuition. Clearly, the empirical 
studies show that networking does not 
automatically work, but that the case is 
far more complex than that. As a con-
sequence, it would be beneficial if net-
works to a larger extent were studied in 
a neutral and structured way. In a 1997 
article outlining a research agenda for 
the field, O’Toole (1997) urged public 
administrators and research colleagues 
to treat networks seriously. It seems 
that his appeal is still relevant.
Regarding the development of Swed-
ish integration policy, the results of this 
study do not put the work with the 
local cooperation agreements in a very 
good light. The reasonable expectation 
that the agreements should have had at 
least some positive impact on integra-
tion is not met. Moreover, some of the 
local agreements seem to have been for-
mal pieces of paper that the actors have 
not cared very much about in practice. 
A relevant question for policy-makers 
to pose is if the present system of coop-
eration agreements is really appropri-
ate and effective. 
Another problem in policy develop-
ment is data scarcity. There is not much 
comparable data on the activities of the 
municipal administrations in the inte-
gration area. A lot of useful informa-
tion that could have been used to guide 
policy development is not available. 
without a clear overview of what is 
going on in the municipalities it is diffi-
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cult to make rational and well-founded 
reforms in order to improve policy 
effectiveness. what is positive on this 
point is that the data shortage and bad 
evaluation opportunities were high-
lighted in a recent government report. 
It was suggested that a new database 
should be built that would help to at 
least partially solve the problem. Such a 
database is really needed (SOU 2008:58, 
p 270–286).
Turning from problems to oppor-
tunities, an improvement of the data 
situation would imply that benchmark-
ing tools could be developed. There 
are pros and cons to benchmarking, 
but in this area I think there would be 
important advantages. If the munici-
pal administrations could get a struc-
tured overview of what is done else-
where and of which implementation 
methods seem to be most effective, 
there are good reasons to believe that 
at least some of them could make use-
ful improvements in their introduction 
and SFI programmes. For municipal 
administrations in small municipali-
ties, which often have limited resources 
to spend on evaluation and strategic 
development, such benchmarking tools 
could be particularly helpful.
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Notes
1  when talking about public administration at the local level in Sweden, I use two different 
English concepts for the Swedish word kommun: municipal administration and municipality. 
Throughout the article, municipal administration refers to the local level administrative unit, 
while municipality refers to the geographical area that is administered by this unit. In Swed-
ish, the word kommun can refer both to the administrative unit and to the geographical 
area, but I believe that a distinction between the different meanings is needed in order for 
the English text to become clear.
2  The strategy of combining quantitative and qualitative was strongly argued for by King, 
Keohane & Verba back in 1994 and is now quite widely recommended (King et al 1994, p 
3-7). Teorell & Svensson (2007, p 264-277), for example, are dedicated proponents of this 
approach.
3  The first central agreement was signed by four actors: the Integration Board, the Na-
tional Labour Market Board (Arbetsmarknadsverket), the National Agency for Education 
(Skolverket) and the Association of Local Authorities and Regions (Sveriges Kommuner 
och Landsting – which had a different name back then). The Migration Board (Migration-
sverket) and the National Agency for School Improvement (Myndigheten för skolutveck-
ling) joined the effort in 2003. when the Integration Board was closed down in 2007, a joint 
working group took over its leading role within the framework of the agreement (Integra-
tionsverket et al 2005, p 17-22; SOU 2008:58, p 98-99).
4  It is noticeable that several key articles present agendas for future research rather than em-
pirical results. See for example O’Toole 1997, Meier and O’Toole 2005, Provan and Milward 
2001, and Provan and Kenis 2007. The development of research on network effectiveness 
seems to be at an early stage. 
5  Another potentially negative aspect is that the issue of responsibility can be troublesome 
in a network setting. If many actors are involved in the delivery of policy, the exact areas of 
responsibility of the different actors are often difficult to make clear. The straight-forward 
question of who is in charge is not always easily answered, which can be confusing for the 
network actors involved as well as for the individuals, associations or companies targeted 
by the policy.
6  There are other network aspects to look at and other hypotheses to test, but in order to 
make the analysis focused and manageable, I limit the study to these two. One obvious 
perspective that I choose to exclude is that of concentration used by Provan & Milward. 
However, the concept of concentration is not really applicable to the networks in the mu-
nicipalities. The municipal administrations are dominant and so clearly in the core role that 
it would be very difficult to empirically observe differences in concentration between the 
municipalities. 
7  Obviously, in measuring integration in this way, the integration situations in other areas 
of society than the labour market are excluded from the integration variable. what inte-
gration looks like in politics or when it comes to housing, for example, is not taken into 
account. It can be argued that it would be more appropriate here to talk not about integra-
tion in general but more specifically about labour market integration. However, I think 
that labour market integration is so much in focus in Swedish integration policy that it is 
motivated to use it as the only indicator in a discussion on integration in general. But at the 
same time, of course, the narrowness of the integration measure has to be fully taken into 
consideration.
8  Several observers have pointed at the lack of comparable data and knowledge in general 
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on how integration policy is implemented in the municipalities (see Riksrevisionen 2006, p 
42, Integrationsverket 2007a, p 40, Eriksson et al 2007, p 79-81, and Emilsson 2008, p 21). As 
a matter of fact, the data shortage and bad evaluation opportunities were highlighted in a 
recent government report (SOU 2008:58, p 270-286).
9  The initial plan was to incorporate five municipalities in the analysis. However, a key re-
spondent, the head of refugee reception activities in Motala, was in the middle of a reor-
ganisation process and had no time for an interview. without that information, I could not 
get good enough insight into the network management routines and therefore decided to 
exclude Motala from the analysis.
10  As to the public actors, I describe the current situation and choose only to incorporate ac-
tors that exist today. The Integration Board, which was shut down in 2007, is not included 
in the analysis.
11  The solid network contact concept as well as the criteria are my own constructions. All 
eight interviews were semi-structured telephone interviews. Two questionnaires were 
used – one for the heads of the integration units and one for the heads of the PES offices. In 
both questionnaires, there were structured as well as open questions. Since the main focus 
was to map the network and network management routines, the questions on that theme 
were structured in a clear way, in line with the analytical model. In the introduction unit 
interviews, all ten network connections in the model were gone through regarding fre-
quency, existence of established routines and quality in the contacts. In the PES interviews, 
the contacts between the local office and the introduction unit were investigated in detail. 
In addition to the structured network questions, a number of open-ended questions were 
included to get a picture of the general integration situation and to get the viewpoint of the 
respondent on the workings of the integration process in the municipality in question. One 
of those open-ended questions was about the existence and significance of a local coopera-
tion agreement in the municipality. The intention was to talk only to the heads of units 
and offices, but when the heads recommended that it would be better if I talked to a well 
informed colleague, I followed that advice.
12  In order to check that the variables are normally distributed, they are studied in histo-
grams. In fact, all variables give the impression of being approximately normal, except 
for the number of refugees received variable. The distribution of this variable is positively 
skewed, with the municipalities clustered towards 0.
13  Since three municipalities – Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö – are much larger than 
the others, it is common practise to use a logarithm version of the population size vari-
able in comparative analyses (Karlsson 2007, p 11). when it comes to timing, integration is 
measured in 2008, while 2005-2007 is the general reference period for the independent vari-
ables. The situation and development during that period is what lead up to the integration 
outcome in 2008. The only data available for the cooperation agreements variable describes 
the situation in June 2005, which is actually a very relevant measurement point. It means 
that the existing agreements have been in use for at least three years when the integration 
outcome is measured in 2008. I do not know how many of the agreements existing in June 
2005 that were in operation throughout the period up to 2008. However, the number of 
agreements stayed roughly the same at least until the end of 2006, which is an indication 
that most of the agreements were in effect for most of the 2005-2008 period (Integrations-
verket 2007b, p 37).
14  The validity of multiple regression conclusions relies on several assumptions. If these as-
sumptions are not true, the results of the analysis can be misleading (Field 2005, p 169-173; 
Lind et al 2008, p 530-531). In this case, the statistics and graphs that are used to check the 
assumptions generally look good. The VIF values confirm that multicollinearity is not a 
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problem. Values in all models are all well above 0,2 and well below 10, which means that 
they are unproblematic (Field 2005, p 196). The Durbin-watson test statistics, 2,098 in the 
Multiple Environment-Implementation-Network model, are close to 2, which implies that the 
residuals are independent (Ibid, p 189). Furthermore, when putting the residuals into a 
histogram, it is clear that they are approximately normally distributed, fully in line with 
what is assumed. Finally, when plotting standardized predicted values against standard-
ized residuals, it is obvious that there is no heteroscedasticity problem (Ibid, p 202-206). 
15  when discussing the conclusions on population size, it must be kept in mind that the vari-
able is included in the analysis in a logarithm version. Since the original and the logarithm 
versions of the variable are not perfectly intercorrelated (r = 0,69), some caution should be 
exercised when conclusions are drawn on the basis of the logarithm version.
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